Implementation via backward induction (Q1183696): Difference between revisions

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+Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
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+A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
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+Subgame Perfect Implementation
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+Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
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+Q3332693
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+Choosing from a tournament
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+Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
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+On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
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+Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
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+Implementation in differential information economies
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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