Rank-based choice correspondences (Q673207): Difference between revisions

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Rank-based choice correspondences	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Rank-based choice correspondences (English)

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Jean-François Laslier

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Economics Letters

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publication date

28 February 1997

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zbMATH Keywords

Voting

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Social choice

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Pareto

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

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Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence

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Condorcet Social Choice Functions

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Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions

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The bipartisan set of a tournament game

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Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison

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Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes

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Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption

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Geometry of voting

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Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution

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Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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Social Choice Scoring Functions

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A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00877-4

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:673207

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