A Shapley value representation of potential games (Q1566896): Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 15:36, 29 May 2024

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A Shapley value representation of potential games
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    A Shapley value representation of potential games (English)
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    14 August 2001
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    In this paper, a characterization of potential games is presented: An \(n\)-player game \(G\) is a potential game in the sense of \textit{D. Monderer} and \textit{L. S. Shapley} [Games Econ. Behav. 14, 124-143 (1996, Zbl 0862.90137)] if and only if there is a family of cooperative games \(G_a\) (indexed by the strategy \(n\)-tuples \(a\) of the game \(G\)) such that the payoff function for player \(i\) at \(a\) is equal to the Shapley value of \(G_a\) for player \(i\) (Theorem 2).
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    potential games
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    Shapley value
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