Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods (Q1611768): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Simultaneous auctions with synergies / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 16:09, 4 June 2024
scientific article
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English | Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods |
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Optimal auctions in a general model of identical goods (English)
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28 August 2002
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The author of the paper studies the optimal auction of identical goods in an asymmetric bidders setting. In contrast to other studies, the author allows for a much more general form of synergy and even negative synergy, where synergy is the difference between the utility of several objects together and the sum of each objects utility. The main restriction in his approach, besides identical goods, is independent bidders' signals.
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auctions
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