Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted (Q697934): Difference between revisions

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+Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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+The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
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+Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Voting by Committees
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+Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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+Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
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+Q4196192
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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