Unique stability in simple coalition formation games (Q705860): Difference between revisions

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+A characterization of graphs that ensure the existence of stable matchings
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+Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
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+Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
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+Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
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+Q4495210
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+Core in a simple coalition formation game
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+On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
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+The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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+Coalition formation games with separable preferences.
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+Stability in coalition formation games
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+On the existence of stable roommate matchings
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+Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
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+Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
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+Q2752936
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+A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
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+Incentive Compatible Behavior in Core-Selecting Organizations
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+Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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+An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
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+Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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+Q3999327
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+On cores and indivisibility
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+Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
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+A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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+A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
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