Restabilizing matching markets at senior level (Q705941): Difference between revisions

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+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
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+``Timing is everything'' and marital bliss
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+Comparative statics in matching markets
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+Q3066116
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Q3999327
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+A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
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