Cooperative games with incomplete information (Q792890): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:42, 14 June 2024

scientific article
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Cooperative games with incomplete information
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    Cooperative games with incomplete information (English)
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    1984
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    A new bargaining solution concept is introduced which is a generalization of the Nash bargaining solution and the Shapley NTU value. These bargaining solutions are efficient and equitable when interpersonal comparisons are made in terms of certain virtual utility scales.
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    cooperative games with incomplete information
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    bargaining solution concept
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    Nash bargaining solution
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    Shapley NTU value
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    virtual utility
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