Indefinite terminating points and the iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q1094342): Difference between revisions
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English | Indefinite terminating points and the iterated prisoner's dilemma |
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Indefinite terminating points and the iterated prisoner's dilemma (English)
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1987
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I present a game-theoretic model of finitely, but indefinitely, iterated two-player Prisoner's Dilemmas. It follows that equilibria do not emerge in such games. This result questions the significance of the fact that cooperative equilibria do emerge in the infinitely iterated games discussed by, among others, \textit{M. Taylor} [``Anarchy and cooperation'', London, Wiley \& Sons (1976)] and \textit{R. Axelrod} [Political Sci. Rev. 75, 306-318 (1981)]. I extend my model to n-player (n\(\geq 2)\) games in ``Iterated n-player prisoner's dilemma games'', Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
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iterated two-player Prisoner's Dilemmas
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