Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings (Q2640416): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
+Normal rank