Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria (Q2641202): Difference between revisions

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Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
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    Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria (English)
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    1990
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    We investigate the implementability of the social choice correspondence induced by constrained rational expectations equilibria. We construct an ``almost continuous'' mechanism that implements it, provided that information held by each agent is non-exclusive.
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    implementability
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    social choice
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    constrained rational expectations equilibria
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