On non-atomic weighted majority games (Q2641237): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 13:50, 21 June 2024

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On non-atomic weighted majority games
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    On non-atomic weighted majority games (English)
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    1990
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    The main result of the paper provides a characterization, in terms of the desirability relation, of those monotonic simple games, on a continuum of players, that have a representation as weighted majority games. Here are the basic definitions: A game is a real function v(\(\cdot)\) defined on the coalitions (namely, measurable sets) in a measurable space. A game is simple if it takes only the values 0 and \(+1\). The game is monotonic if \(S\supset T\) implies v(S)\(\geq v(T)\). The desirability relation is defined by: The coalition S is at least as desirable as T if v(S\(\cup U)\geq v(T\cup U)\) whenever U does not intersect \(S\cup T\). It is clear that a weighted majority game is simple, monotonic and its desirability relation is complete. The paper shows that with a continuum of players, the converse holds provided some technical continuity conditions (that hold for weighted majority games) are fulfilled. The result is extended to a characterization of games that can be represented as \(f\circ \mu\), with \(\mu\) a nonatomic measure, and f a non-decreasing upper semicontinuous function.
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    monotonic simple games
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    continuum of players
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    weighted majority games
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    desirability relation
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