A local theory of cooperative games (Q757262): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:10, 21 June 2024

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A local theory of cooperative games
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    A local theory of cooperative games (English)
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    1990
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    The complete description of the payoff functions is often impossible if game theoretical models of real situations are constructed. However, it can be possible to determine the gradient of profits following from the transmission from a given strategy vector to some others. A theory of such game models is suggested in the paper. The main results concern the development of strategy choices in such games, and the properties of stable situations represented by specific modifications of the concept of core.
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    coalition
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    local core
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    stable situations
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