Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain (Q859595): Difference between revisions

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+Voting by Committees
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+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
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+Normal rank
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+Arrow and Gibbard--Satterthwaite revisited. Extended domains and shorter proofs
+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
+Normal rank
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+Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
+Normal rank
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+Q3204946
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+Normal rank
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Normal rank
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
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+Q4197570
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+Normal rank
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+Queue allocation of indivisible goods
@@ Property / cites work: Queue allocation of indivisible goods / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
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+Normal rank