Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice (Q859603): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Acyclic Collective Choice Rules / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Social Decision Functions and the Veto / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Fixed agenda social choice theory: Correspondence and impossibility theorems for social choice correspondences and social decision functions / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Axioms for Lexicographic Preferences / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Characterization of social choice sets in terms of individuals' maximal sets: the fixed agenda framework / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 11:38, 25 June 2024

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Hierarchies of power in non-binary social choice
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