Credulity, lies, and costly talk (Q2373768): Difference between revisions

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+Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
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+Q5574850
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+Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
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+Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
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+Q5848416
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+Strategic Information Transmission
@@ Property / cites work: Strategic Information Transmission / rank @@
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+An experimental study of strategic information transmission
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+Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
@@ Property / cites work: Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games / rank @@
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+Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
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+Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
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+Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games
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+Informal communication
@@ Property / cites work: Informal communication / rank @@
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+Naive audience and communication bias
@@ Property / cites work: Naive audience and communication bias / rank @@
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+A Theory of Credibility
@@ Property / cites work: A Theory of Credibility / rank @@
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