Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting (Q996364): Difference between revisions

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+Common Agency
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+Normal rank
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+Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment
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+Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
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+Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
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+Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
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+Normal rank
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+Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
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+Optimal Contracts when Enforcement is a Decision Variable
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+The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
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+The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public
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+Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency.
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+The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
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+Contracting with Externalities
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+Corporate Governance
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+Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
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