Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games (Q2455676): Difference between revisions

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+Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
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+Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
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+Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
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+On rationalizability in extensive games
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+Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
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+Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
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+Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
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+Sequential Equilibria
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+Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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+Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
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+Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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+Proper rationalizability and backward induction
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