Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent (Q943879): Difference between revisions

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+Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
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+Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
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+Normal rank
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+Bad Reputation
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+Normal rank
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+Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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+Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
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+Reputation and imperfect information
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
@@ Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank @@
+Normal rank