Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences (Q2519487): Difference between revisions

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+Exact implementation
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+Normal rank
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+Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
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+Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
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+Nash implementation without no-veto power
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+Normal rank
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+On exiting after voting
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+Normal rank
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+A crash course in implementation theory
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+The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Normal rank
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+Subgame Perfect Implementation
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+Normal rank
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+Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
+Normal rank
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+Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
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+Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
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