Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control (Q3599137): Difference between revisions

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+The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
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+Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
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+How hard is it to control an election?
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+Q3323629
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+Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
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+Q3626678
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+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
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+Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
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+Q3624046
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+Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
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+Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
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+Q4198056
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
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+Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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