A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games (Q1007331): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 04:42, 29 June 2024

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A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
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    A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games (English)
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    20 March 2009
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    repeated game
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    private monitoring
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    almost-perfect monitoring
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    belief-free equilibrium
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    characterization
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