Commitment games (Q1021610): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 15:55, 1 July 2024

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Commitment games
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    Commitment games (English)
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    8 June 2009
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    This paper deals with a commitment game. A commitment game is a two-stage game, in which players can commit to some of their pure strategies in the first stage, and play the altered game in the second stage. The main result provides a complete characterization of the set of implementable strategies in such games.
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    commitment
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    efficiency
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    self-enforcing agreement
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    repeated games
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