The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions (Q1026443): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 17:44, 1 July 2024

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The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions
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    The fuzzy core in games with fuzzy coalitions (English)
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    25 June 2009
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    The referred paper presents a proposition of a new definition of fuzzy core generalizing the crisp one. The suggested concept of fuzzy core regards games with fuzzy coalitions, and its definition is based on the assumption that the fuzzy core distributes the total income of a fuzzy coalition among its players with positive rate of participation. Nonemptiness of this sort of fuzzy core is based on the fuzzy convexity property. Three modifications of the fuzzy core are analyzed, and the relationship between fuzzy core and fuzzy Shapley value, stronger than its analogy in crisp cooperative games, is derived.
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    cooperative game
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    fuzzy coalition
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    fuzzy core
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    Shapley function
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    fuzzy Shapley value
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    convexity of cooperative game
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