A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions (Q2389312): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:34, 1 July 2024

scientific article
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English
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
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    A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions (English)
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    15 July 2009
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    strategy-proofness
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    manipulation
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    Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
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    social choice correspondences
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    hyperfunctions
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