Gains from manipulating social choice rules (Q2391056): Difference between revisions

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+Q4495209
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+The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
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+Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
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+The Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem: A simple proof
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+Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems
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+Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
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+Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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+The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
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+The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
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+Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
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+Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
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+Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
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+Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
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+Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
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+Q4196192
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+A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
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+On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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+Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
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+Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
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