Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods (Q836928): Difference between revisions

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+Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
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+Strategy-proof allotment rules
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+An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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+A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
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+The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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+Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
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+Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods
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+More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
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+A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
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+A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem
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+Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
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+Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
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+Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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