Interrogative belief revision in modal logic (Q1037377): Difference between revisions

Since it was formulated in 1985, the AGM account of belief revision has been the subject of a number of reformulations and expansions from different perspectives. Both are involved in various reconstructions from the perspective of modal logic, which bring the notion of belief and its iteration into the object language. A recent kind of expansion, known as interrogative belief change and due to Olsson and Westlund, expands belief change frameworks to cover the research agenda of the believing agent, that is, questions to which it wishes to find answers. The purpose of the paper under review is to integrate these two developments into a whole, to give an interrogative belief revision that is couched in the language of modal logic. The starting-point is chosen as Segerberg's system DDL of dynamic doxastic logic, but it is also shown how essentially the same integration may be carried out from a modal logic of belief revision due to Bonanno. In both contexts, questions arise concerning the interplay between the modal and research-agenda operations.