Characterizing best-worst voting systems in the scoring context (Q2268897): Difference between revisions

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+Q2783476
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+The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
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+Implementability via protective equilibria
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+Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
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+A simple characterization of plurality rule
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+Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
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+Positionalist voting functions
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+Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
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+An axiomatic characterization of different majority concepts
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+Some probabilistic models of best, worst, and best --- worst choices
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+A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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+A characterization result for the plurality rule
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
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+A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
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