Manipulation via capacities revisited (Q980957): Difference between revisions

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Manipulation via capacities revisited	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Manipulation via capacities revisited (English)

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Games and Economic Behavior

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publication date

8 July 2010

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zbMATH Keywords

two-sided matching

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stability

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manipulation

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capacities

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.006

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Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems

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A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement

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Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

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Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets

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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

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When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results

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Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets

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The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

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The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

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Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1016/j.geb.2009.12.006

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:980957

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