Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions (Q992056): Difference between revisions

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Property / cites work: Information revelation in auctions / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 03:45, 3 July 2024

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Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
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