The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries (Q1959114): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 07:37, 3 July 2024

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The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
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    The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries (English)
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    6 October 2010
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    self-enforcing international environmental agreements
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    non-cooperative game theory
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    stability
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    nonlinear optimization
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