The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules (Q1959697): Difference between revisions

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+Condorcet’s Paradox
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+Normal rank
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+Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
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+Constant scoring rules, Condorcet criteria and single-peaked preferences
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+Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates
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+On the positive association of parliamentary social choice functions
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+Q3993509
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+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
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+Social Choice Scoring Functions
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+Normal rank