The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization (Q617604): Difference between revisions

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+Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
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+A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
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+Secure implementation in allotment economies
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+Normal rank
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+Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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+A simple characterization of the uniform rule
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+Normal rank
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+An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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+The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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+Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
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+More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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+A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
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+Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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