Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values (Q719874): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A note on the incentive compatible core / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Efficiency in coalition games with externalities / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: N‐person games in partition function form / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Bidder collusion / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Cooperative games with incomplete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Q5433153 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equilibrium binding agreements / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 13:23, 4 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
scientific article

    Statements

    Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    12 October 2011
    0 references
    auctions
    0 references
    Bayesian game
    0 references
    collusion
    0 references
    core
    0 references
    partition function game
    0 references

    Identifiers