Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (Q431213): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:28, 5 July 2024

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Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
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    Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism (English)
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    26 June 2012
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    shill bidding
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    VCG mechanism
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    combinatorial auctions
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    winner determination problem
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    collusion
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