Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case (Q2276546): Difference between revisions

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+Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design
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+Robust Mechanism Design
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+The package assignment model.
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+Informational limitations of ascending combinatorial auctions
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+Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
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+On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
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+Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions
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+The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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+The English auction with differentiated commodities
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+Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
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+Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Q4902563
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+Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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+Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
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+Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
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+How communication improves efficiency in bargaining games
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