Social norms and trust among strangers (Q2276552): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:00, 5 July 2024

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Social norms and trust among strangers
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    Social norms and trust among strangers (English)
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    6 November 2012
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    trust and reciprocity
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    infinitely repeated game
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    random matching
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    contagious strategy
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    sequential equilibrium
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