Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact (Q2276558): Difference between revisions

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+Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
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+Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
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+Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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+Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
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+Repeated Games with Frequent Signals<sup>*</sup>
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+The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
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+Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient
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+Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
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+Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies
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+Multimarket contact in continuous-time games
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+Multimarket contact, imperfect monitoring, and implicit collusion
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+An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
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+The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
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+On interdependent supergames: Multimarket contact, concavity, and collusion
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