Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! (Q1934150): Difference between revisions

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+Asymmetric Auctions
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+Normal rank
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+Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers
@@ Property / cites work: Auctions with synergies and asymmetric buyers / rank @@
+Normal rank
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Normal rank
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+Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
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+Tacit collusion in repeated auctions.
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+Normal rank
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+Sequential auctions for stochastically equivalent complementary objects
+Normal rank