The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets (Q2376989): Difference between revisions

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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Unravelling in two-sided matching markets and similarity of preferences
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+The dynamics of law clerk matching: an experimental and computational investigation of proposals for reform of the market
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+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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+The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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+Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
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