MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY (Q2854007): Difference between revisions

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+Stable matchings with couples
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+Stable marriage and genetic algorithms: a fertile union
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+The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
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+Stable matching with couples
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+Size versus stability in the marriage problem
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+The stability of hedonic coalition structures
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+Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Q3995616
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Stable matchings and preferences of couples
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+Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
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+Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)
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+Corrigendum to ``stable matchings and preferences of couples''
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+Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
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+Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
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+Stable assignment with couples: parameterized complexity and local search
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+Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
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+Algorithmic Game Theory
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+NP-complete stable matching problems
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+Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
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+Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
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+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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+The Core of an N Person Game
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+Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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