Dictatorial Mechanisms in Constrained Combinatorial Auctions (Q2867515): Difference between revisions

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+Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
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+Q5417648
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+Normal rank
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+Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
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+Multi-unit auctions: beyond Roberts
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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
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+A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
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+Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
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+Q3624066
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+Q3867502
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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