Application fee manipulations in matching markets (Q393269): Difference between revisions

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+Group robust stability in matching markets
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+The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
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+Q3066116
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Manipulation via capacities revisited
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Robust stability in matching markets
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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