Bribery in voting with CP-nets (Q2436697): Difference between revisions

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+Q3056948
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+Q2783476
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+Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
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+When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
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+Multivariate complexity analysis of Swap Bribery
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+Swap Bribery
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+How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?
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