Electing a parliament (Q2452119): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+A Theory of Divided Government
@@ Property / cites work: A Theory of Divided Government / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Persistent equilibria in strategic games
@@ Property / cites work: Persistent equilibria in strategic games / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
@@ Property / cites work: On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
@@ Property / cites work: Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
@@ Property / cites work: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On stability of perfect equilibrium points
@@ Property / cites work: On stability of perfect equilibrium points / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy?
@@ Property / cites work: Do Political Institutions Shape Economic Policy? / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
+Normal rank