A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents (Q2452129): Difference between revisions

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+The uniform rule with several commodities: a generalization of Sprumont's characterization
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+Single-peaked preferences with several commodities
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+Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities
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+Strategy-Proof Exchange
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+Generalized median voter schemes and committees
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+Strategy-proof allotment rules
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+Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
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+Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
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+Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
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+Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
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+An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
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+A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
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+Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
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+Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
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+Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
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+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
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+On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
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+Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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+Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem
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+Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
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+House allocation with transfers
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+Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
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+Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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+Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
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+Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
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+Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
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+Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies
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+Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
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+The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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+Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
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+Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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+The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
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+Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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