Optimal truncation in matching markets (Q485816): Difference between revisions

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+Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
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+Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem
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+Optimal truncation in matching markets
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
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+Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
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+Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Q2921653
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+Q4130997
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
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+Non-cooperative games
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+The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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+On likely solutions of a stable marriage problem
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+On the Number of Fixed Pairs in a Random Instance of the Stable Marriage Problem
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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