Outside opportunities and termination (Q2347777): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Set OpenAlex properties.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Theory of Wage Dynamics / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implications of Efficient Risk Sharing without Commitment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Repeated moral hazard and one-sided commitment / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: The Time Structure of Self-Enforcing Agreements / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Foreign Direct Investment and the Risk of Expropriation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Dynamic Insurance with Private Information and Balanced Budgets / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 05:18, 10 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Outside opportunities and termination
scientific article

    Statements

    Identifiers