Pay for performance under hierarchical contracting (Q2351400): Difference between revisions

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+Decentralization and collusion
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+Normal rank
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+The Firm as a Communication Network
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+Normal rank
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+Optimal compensation with hidden action and lump-sum payment in a continuous-time model
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+Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Normal rank
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+Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
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+Optimal Contracts for Teams
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+Normal rank
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+The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
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+A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
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+The first-order approach to the continuous-time principal-agent problem with exponential utility
+Normal rank